fixes #21
4.0 KiB
+++ title = "Transports" weight = 30 +++
A transport provides an authenticated io.ReadWriteCloser to the RPC layer.
(An io.ReadWriteCloser is essentially a bidirectional reliable communication channel.)
Currently, only the ssh+stdinserver transport is supported.
ssh+stdinserver
The way the ssh+stdinserver transport works is inspired by git shell and Borg Backup.
It is implemented in the Go package github.com/zrepl/zrepl/sshbytestream.
The config excerpts are taken from the [tutorial]({{< relref "tutorial/_index.md" >}}) which you should complete before reading further.
serve
jobs:
- name: pull_backup
type: source
serve:
type: stdinserver
client_identity: backup-srv.example.com
...
The serving job opens a UNIX socket named after client_identity in the runtime directory, e.g. /var/run/zrepl/stdinserver/backup-srv.example.com.
On the same machine, the zrepl stdinserver $client_identity command connects to that socket.
For example, zrepl stdinserver backup-srv.example.com connects to the UNIX socket /var/run/zrepl/stdinserver/backup-srv.example.com.
It then passes its stdin and stdout file descriptors to the zrepl daemon via cmsg(3).
zrepl daemon in turn combines them into an io.ReadWriteCloser:
a Write() turns into a write to stdout, a Read() turns into a read from stdin.
Interactive use of the stdinserver subcommand does not make much sense.
However, we can force its execution when a user with a particular SSH pubkey connects via SSH.
This can be achieved with an entry in the authorized_keys file of the serving zrepl daemon.
# for OpenSSH >= 7.2
command="zrepl stdinserver CLIENT_IDENTITY",restrict CLIENT_SSH_KEY
# for older OpenSSH versions
command="zrepl stdinserver CLIENT_IDENTITY",no-port-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-pty,no-agent-forwarding,no-user-rc CLIENT_SSH_KEY
- CLIENT_IDENTITY is substituted with
backup-srv.example.comin our example - CLIENT_SSH_KEY is substituted with the public part of the SSH keypair specified in the
connectdirective on the connecting host.
{{% notice note %}}
You may need to adjust the PermitRootLogin option in /etc/ssh/sshd_config to forced-commands-only or higher for this to work.
Refer to sshd_config(5) for details.
{{% / notice %}}
To recap, this is of how client authentication works with the ssh+stdinserver transport:
- Connections to the
client_identityUNIX socket are blindly trusted by zrepl daemon. - Thus, the runtime directory must be private to the zrepl user (checked by zrepl daemon)
- The admin of the host with the serving zrepl daemon controls the
authorized_keysfile. - Thus, the administrator controls the mapping
PUBKEY -> CLIENT_IDENTITY.
connect
jobs:
- name: pull_app-srv
type: pull
connect:
type: ssh+stdinserver
host: app-srv.example.com
user: root
port: 22
identity_file: /etc/zrepl/ssh/identity
options: # optional
- "Compression=on"
The connecting zrepl daemon
- Creates a pipe
- Forks
- In the forked process
- Replaces forked stdin and stdout with the corresponding pipe ends
- Executes the
sshbinary found in$PATH.- The identity file (
-i) is set to$identity_file. - The remote user, host and port correspond to those configured.
- Further options can be specified using the
optionsfield, which appends each entry in the list to the command line using-o $entry.
- The identity file (
- Wraps the pipe ends in an
io.ReadWriteCloserand uses it for RPC.
As discussed in the section above, the connecting zrepl daemon expects that zrepl stdinserver $client_identity is executed automatically via an authorized_keys file entry.
{{% notice info %}}
The environment variables of the underlying SSH process are cleared. $SSH_AUTH_SOCK will not be available.
It is suggested to create a separate, unencrypted SSH key solely for that purpose.
{{% / notice %}}